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IMPLICATIONS OF THE JOHN WILEY
CASE FOR BUSINESS TRANSFERS,
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, AND
ARBITRATION
TuoirAs M. PATRIOX,

JR.*

I. INMODUCTIO1

An increasingly important problem in labor-management relations is the extent to which rights and obligations created by a
collective bargaining agreement survive a transfer of ownership
in the business. Although particular situations vary a good deal,
the general conflict which has arisen over this question results
from a sharp clash between the entrepreneur's interest in freedom to reorganize business enterprise and labor's interest in job
security.' Early in 1964, the Supreme Court in John Wiley d
Sons v. Livingston,2 established a basis for resolving disputes
over the survival of collective agreements within the existing
institutional structure of labor-management relations. Relying
on the federal labor policy favoring the achievement of industrial stability through arbitration, 3 the Court directed that such
disputes be submitted to arbitration4 when the collective agreement contains a general arbitration provision.5
* LL.B., University of Virginia, 1963; Associate (On military leave, United
States Army 1965-67), Wyche, Burgess, Freeman and Parham, Greenville,
South Carolina.
1. Compare Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, pp. 4, 8-12, John Wiley
& Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), with Brief for Appellee, pp. 19-26,
United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964),
and Farmer, Bargaining Requirements in Connection with Sub-Contracting,
Plant Removal, Sale of Business, Merger and Consolidation, 14 LAB. L.J. 957
(1963). See also NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); 17
S.C.L. REv. 577 (1965) (public interests in efficient economic system permits
free withdrawal of capital from marginal enterprise).
2. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
3. Id. at 548-49.
4. The Court declared that the "objective of national labor policy . . .
requires that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some
protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship." Id. at 549.
5. Today, grievance provisions are contained in 99% of all bargaining agreements. BUREAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS
51:1 (5th ed. 1961). As the ultimate step in the grievance procedure, one
source estimates that 94% of all labor contracts provide for arbitration of
grievances which arise under the agreement and are not settled by the parties.
Id. at 51:7. A more recent survey indicates that of the estimated 50,000 col-
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Although the Wiley doctrine is by no means a panacea, it will
serve to forestall, at least temporarily, strikes over survival
problems. More importantly, the doctrine has had and will continue to have a strong influence on the positions taken by the
parties at the time of bargaining and at the time when transfer
is contemplated. If the selling employer and the union fail to
reach agreement during original bargaining on the consequences
of a transfer, or if either employer is likewise unable to reach
an accord with the union at the time of transfer, the parties will
have almost certainly surrendered their complete control of the
situation to the arbitrator.
This article will examine the Wiley decision and the cases
applying it to impose arbitration upon a successor employer. It
will also suggest some of the factors to be considered by arbitrators in determining whether substantive rights and duties
have survived a transfer. A potential conflict between arbitrators and the National Labor Relations Board or the courts will
be discussed in relation to the possible evolution of judicial
review for Wiley doctrine arbitrations. Finally, the merits of
pre-transfer bargaining as the best means of handling the survival problem will be discussed.
While this article is relevant primarily for corporate and labor
practitioners, it should also be of interest to attorneys with a
general interest in the process of common law development. The
many problems which Wiley raises both for business transfers
and for arbitration generally must be resolved largely through
the evolving federal common law of labor. 6 If there is a genius
in the common law, and if lawyers and courts are to fulfill their
lective bargaining agreements, 95% contain arbitration clauses. See Hays, The
Fttire of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965). Of this number, less
than 3% specify that a dispute may be submitted to arbitration only by mutual
agreement. BUREAU OF NAT'L ArFAiRs, supra at 51:7.
Although general arbitration provisions are prevalent in bargaining agree-

ments, about 60% place some explicit restrictions on the scope of arbitration or
the power of the arbitrator. BuREAu OF NAT'L AFAiRs, supra at 51:9 (5th ed.
1961). Of these, about 88% contain the general restriction that the arbitrator
may not alter or add to the contract. Ibid.
Where the contract contains no arbitration provision, the courts will deal
with the issue of survival by developing their own substantive law under
§ 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
145 (1964), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), the relevant portions of which are found
in note 18 infra. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). The application, as controlling precedent, which this evolving case
law may have on arbitration will be discussed in notes 109-114 and accompanying text infra.
6. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See
notes 18-23 and accompanying text in!fra.
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traditional roles in this system's development, recognition of
these problems is essential to sound, pragmatic solutions.7
II. JOHN WILEY AND rrS PROGENY

A. The Decisiona Background of Wiley
At common law, collective bargaining agreements were treated
as ordinary contracts. Accordingly, the courts generally rejected
attempts to impose obligations in a collective agreement on a
subsequent employer, reasoning that one not a party to a contract
was not bound by its terms.9 It was recognized, however, that
a subsequent employer could voluntarily assume his predecessor's
labor obligations' 0 either expressly or by implication, 1 agreeing
to be bound by the entire agreement or any of its particular
terms.' 2 Moreover, courts occasionally imposed contractual obligations on a subsequent employer as a matter of law, relying on
his relationship to the prior employer rather than on his actual
7. See Friendly, The Gap in Lawrmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Wont, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 787, 789 (1963); Jones & Smith, The
Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law,
63 M cH. L. REV. 751, 808 (1965). But see the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957)
where he expressed doubt that the judiciary could cope with the manifold
problems of developing a federal common law of labor under § 301. He concluded that "there are severe limits on 'judicial inventiveness' even for the most
imaginative judge." Ibid.
8. See GREGORY, LAoR AND THE LAW 445-57 (2d rev. ed. 1961). See
generally Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1958); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law it Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Office Employees v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). Bona fide purchasers of a going business have generally not
been bound by their predecessor's labor agreement. See International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 189 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951), afI'd
on other grounds, 342 U.S. 237 (1952) ; Gold v. Gibbons, 178 Cal. App.2d 517
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Tarr v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 73
Idaho 223, 250 P.2d 904 (1952) ; Carouso v. Empire Case Goods Co., 271 App.
Div. 149; 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1946), af'd, 297 N.Y. 514, 74 N.E.2d 462 (1947);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See cases cited 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 917 n.115
(1965).
10. See Gold v. Gibbons, 178 Cal. App.2d 517 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
11. See Argo Steel Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1959) ; Application
of Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct 1947). However, courts have been
reluctant to impose contractual obligations by implication in the absence of a
strong element of estoppel or reasonable union reliance. See, e.g., International
Longshoreman's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 189 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951),
aff'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 237 (1952); Application of Swift & Co., 76
N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
12. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R2d 846 (1950) on the severability of
provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
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adts or intent.13 Unions contended that a similar result should
be reached when the agreement contained a "survivor" or "successor clause," i.e., a provision which stated the agreement was
binding upon the union or its successor and an employer or its
successor. 14 Most courts, however, were unwilling to give effect
to such clauses. 15
Even where courts at common law did enforce outstanding
bargaining agreements following a transfer, they virtually never
ordered specific performance of the agreements' provisions to
submit labor disputes to arbitration. 10 These courts based their
decisions on the principle that an agreement to arbitrate a
17
future dispute was revocable by either party prior to an award.
Following the enactment in 194,7 of section 301 of the Taft13. E.g., United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 568

(E.D. Pa. 1960); Minkoff v. H. & L. Dress Corp., 10 Misc. 2d 828, 171
N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1958); cf. Herman Loewenstein, 75 N.L.R.B. 377, 379
(1947). This most often occurred where the successor employer was merely the
alter ego of his predecessor and the transfer was part of an attempt to avoid
labor obligations under an existing bargaining agreement. See, e.g., United
Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., supra; cf. NLRB v. O'Keefe &
Merritt Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 445 (9d Cir. 1949) ; C. & D. Coal Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
799 (1951). See also Journeyman Barbers Union v. Ector, 32 Ohio Op.2d 497
203 N.E.2d 370 (1964).
At times, courts were able to justify survival under principles of corporate
law. See 15 FLECuER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 7086, 7109-10 (rev. vol.
1961). Such an argument was made by the union in Wiley, and was based
upon N.Y. STocx Bus. LAW § 90 which deals with survival of the rights of
creditors of consolidated corporations. 376 U.S. at 547-48. However, this contention was rejected by the Court's determination that federal labor law, not
state corporation law, was controlling. Id. at 548.
14. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, p. 18 n.2, United Steelworkers v. Reliance
Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
Successor clauses are commonly found in collective bargaining agreements.
See, e.g., Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 161, 756 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1959);
Matter of Acme Backing Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 963, 142 N.E.2d 427 (1957).
15. See, e.g., International Machinists v. Shawnee Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp.
347, 350-51 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Tarr v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 73 Idaho 223, 250 P.2d 904 (1952). But see Polaner v. Gold Medal
Grill, Inc., 52 Ohio Op. 282, 117 N.E.2d 62 (1951) (court gave effect to
clause purporting to bind successors). In the few cases where the courts
have looked to successor clauses to impose contract obligations on a subsequent employer, the facts have evidenced a substantial continuity of the
vendor's proprietary or financial interest in the business. Ibid. See cases cited
note 13 supra.
16. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 550 (1932) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1919
(rev. ed. 1938). See generally Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts for

Arbitration or Valuation, 1

CORNELL

L.Q. 225 (1916) ; 12 S.C.L.Q. 345-46 &

n.3 (1960).
17. Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 82a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598-99 (1609).
See generally 47 VA. L. REv. 1182 (1961).
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Hartley Act,1 8 however, the courts,' 9 pursuant to the Supreme
Court's directive in Lincoln Mills,20 undertook to fashion a federal common law of industrial relations from the policies of
national labor laws. 21 This approach resulted in at least two
alterations in the general common law concerning bargaining
agreements, and laid a foundation for the Wiley decision. First,
in the Steelworkers Trilogy,22 the Supreme Court asserted that
a collective bargaining agreement is not essentially a contract,
but rather a generalized code created "to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate .... 23 Thus,
although a collective agreement does represent an exchange of
promises, its primary function is to establish the rules governing the employer-employee relationship. These rules bind the
parties not by virtue of the principles of contract law, but by
virtue of the federal labor policy of promoting industrial peace.
Secondly, beginning in 1961 with the Trilogy, the Supreme
Court has fashioned a body of substantive federal common law
delineating the respective roles of the arbitrator and the courts
in the grievance process. Although there are still many gaps in
this developing body of law, the Trilogy and subsequent cases
18. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 61
Stat. 145 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964) which provides in part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce...
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
19. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreement under § 301(a). E.g., Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). State courts must, however, apply federal law in
these actions. E.g., Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962),
14 S.C.L.Q. 560 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502

(1962), 14 S.C.L.Q. 560 (1962).
20. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
Here, the court said that "the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our nation.l
labor laws." Ibid.

21. See generally Elson, The Supreme Court and the Private World of
Arbitration, 18 ARB. J. 65 (1963).
22. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23. 363 U.S. at 578-80.
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have greatly expanded the scope of an arbitrator's powers,2 4
provided greater sanctity for his final determination on the
merits 25 and correspondingly limited the role of the courts.2 6
24. See Mayer, Judicial "Bulls" in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LAn. L.J. 502-03 (1951), where the author noted that, at that time,
"the court insists that the obligation to arbitrate [a contract] must be 'perfectly
expressed' to the extent that even judges cannot find it possible to uncross a T
or undot an 'i' with respect to the language used by the contracting parties."
The Supreme Court distinguished the labor situation, however, noting that
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is a substitute for a strike,
whereas in a commercial arbitration it replaces litigation. Thus, the traditional
judicial reluctance toward compelling parties to arbitrate is not applicable to
labor arbitration. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960) ; see Marshall, Contract Enforcement and the Courts, 15 LAB.
L.J. 577, 578 (1964).
25. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960) (Court refused to review merits of arbitrator's award despite
ambiguity); Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms:
.4Report with Comments, 62 MicH. L. Rxv. 1115, 1119-20 (1964) which summarizes the impact of the Trilogy, noting:
These decisions have been interpreted, correctly we think, as having
sharply reduced the opportunity to make effective use of the courts in
either an attempt to intercept the submission of the issues to arbitration
or to upset the awards which result.
See generally Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37
N.Y.U.L. RIv. 471 (1962).
26. E.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
See Smith, Arbitrability-The Arbitrator, the Courts, and the Parties, 17
Ann. J. 3, 8-11 (1962) and Note, 47 VA. L. Rlv. 1182-83 (1961). These articles
note that the meaning of "arbitrability" may vary greatly depending on the
stage of the proceeding at which the issue arises, i.e., in a suit to compel arbitration; during the arbitration; or in a suit to avoid or enforce an award.
The issue of arbitrability may be more specifically subdivided into issues of
"substantive arbitrability" and "procedural arbitrability". As the term "arbitrable" is most often used, it refers to "substantive arbitrability," that is, the
authority of the arbitrator to hear the issues of a dispute. While the arbitrator
usually rules on his authority to hear a matter, this is usually a provisional
determination, and either party may seek an ultimate determination of the issue
by a court. Of course, the parties can provide in the agreement that any
dispute as to whether a particular claim is within the arbitration clause, is itself
for the arbitrator to decide. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Several commentators have noted that the issue of substantive arbitrability,
which encompasses the authority to hear a dispute, should be distinguished
from the issue in a subsequent action to question the arbitrator's authority to
mnake his award. See Smith, supra, at 11-15; Wellington, Judicial Review of
the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 471, 483-84 (1962). They point
out that an arbitrator will at times hear frivolous claims because of the
"therapeutic values" of arbitration. See 363 U.S. at 568. Thus, while he will
have authority to hear the dispute, he would have no authority under the
agreement to make the requested award. E.g., Carey v. General Elec. Co.,
315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964) ; New Bedford
Defense Products Div. v. Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958);
see, e.g., Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1020-22
(1965). In Carey, the court held that limiting language in the bargaining
agreement went not to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, but to his "authority" to
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For example, where a collective agreement contains a general
arbitration provision, the Court held that unless an issue is
expressly excluded from consideration, it will be presumed that
2
arbitration was intended. 7
Relying on the developing federal labor policy favoring arbi28
tration, which in effect superceded common law contract rules,
unions began to allege that while perhaps all contractual obligations do not survive a business transfer, at least the duty to
arbitrate a grievance survives. 2 9 Lower federal courts consistently denied such efforts, however, some stating that legislation
would be necessary to abrogate the requirement that the consent
of a successor employer was required to bind him to a prior
collective agreement. 30 Others continued to deny arbitration on
contractual grounds, relying on language in the Trilogy to the
make an award. In New Bedford, the court noted that the matter was arbitrable, but the dispute could be correctly decided only one way.
The issue of "procedural arbitrability" raises questions of compliance by the
party seeking arbitration with the steps required to initiate the proceeding. In
Wiley, the court held that this issue was for the arbitrator's determination
since it was so intertwined with the merits of the dispute. 376 U.S. at 555-59.
This vagueness of terms is partially due to a terrible penchant of both the
judiciary and commentators to confuse the issue of jurisdiction to arbitrate
with the merits of a dispute. See, e.g., Gould, The Supreme Court and Labor
Law-An Analysis of Recent Trends, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 819, 822 (1965).
This confusion is due in part to the fact that the issue of the merits and jurisdiction are almost always intertwined to a degree.
Not only has the jurisdiction of the arbitrator grown at the expense of the
courts, but there has been a concurrent expansion of arbitration into the once
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962). See notes 83-88 infra and accompanying text.
27. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &;Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960). Thus, it is obvious that the Court has abandoned the strict rule of
contract interpretation which required arbitration of an issue only if expressly
provided for in the language of the agreement.
28. E.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1963). "State
law may be utilized so far as it is of aid in the developing of correct principles
or their application in a particular case, but the law which ultimately results
is federal." Ibid.
29. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. International Plant Guard Workers, 55
L.R.R.M. 2554 (9th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964) ;
Livingston v. Gindoff Textile Corp., 191 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Office
Employees v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. See United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 843,
845-46 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), where the district
court reasoned that to impose the previous owner's labor contract upon the
new owner would be "such a complete innovation that it cannot be regarded as
a feature of federal common law under 29 U.S.C. § 185 [§ 301], but must
await adoption through the legislative sanction of Congress." Ibid.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAiOLENA LAW REviW[

[Vol. 18

effect that the agreement to arbitrate was a matter of contract. 31
Prior to Wiley, no court had accepted the argument that the
legal hiatus between a prior employer's express agreement to
arbitrate and a subsequent employer's failure to adopt the agreement could be spanned by federal labor policy.
B. The "Wiley Decision
In the 'Wiley case itself, Interscience, a relatively small publisher, had been merged into Wiley, a large publisher,3 2 none of
whose employees were represented by a union.3 3 Interscience
had previously entered into a bargaining agreement, which contained a broad arbitration clause, 34 and which did not expire
until four months after the merger. The union made numerous
efforts to negotiate a settlement on the effects of the merger,
first with Interscience and later with Wiley, but the parties
were unable to reach an agreement.3 5 While the negotiations
continued, most of the former Interscience employees were transferred to the Wiley plant, which was nearby, and integrated into
the larger, substantially identical Wiley unit. A week before
the termination date of the contract the union brought action
under section 301 to compel Wiley, who contended that the bar31. See, e.g., Office Employees v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). The court quoted from Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in the
Warrior & Gulf case to the effect that "arbitration is a matter of contract and
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute to which he
has not agreed so to submit." 363 U.S. 582.
32. It should be noted that in neither Wiley nor its progeny has there been
any dispute that transfer was for other than genuine business reasons.
33. At the time of the merger Interscience had about eighty employees,
forty of whom were represented by the Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO. Wiley had about three hundred employees, none of
whom were represented by a union. 376 U.S. at 545. See generally Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 5-15, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
34. Id. at 553. The Wiley-Livingston Agreement provided that:
Any differences, grievance or dispute between the Employer and the
Union arising out of or relating to this agreement, or its interpretation
or application, or enforcement, shall be subject to the following procedures, which shall be resorted to as the sole means of obtaining adjustment of the difference, grievance, or dispute, hereinafter referred to
as "grievance."
313 F.2d at 64.
Moreover, the agreement did not contain a "successor clause," 376 U.S. at
544, nor did Wiley expressly assume the labor obligations under the contract.
Ibid.
35. Id. at 545. See generally Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-15, John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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gaining agreement had terminated with the merger, to arbitrate
regarding rights which the union claimed had survived. 36
In affirming the Second Circuit's order submitting the dispute to arbitration 37 the Supreme Court maintained that the
question of whether the duty to arbitrate survived was for the
court, not the arbitrator, to decide.38 In a unanimous opinion
the Court held:
[T]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer
which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of
the employees covered by the agreement, and ...

in appro-

priate circumstances, present here, the successor employer
36. The employees' claims involved seniority, pensions, severance pay, vacation, and job security. 376 U.S. at 552.
Since United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
595, 599 (1960), it has been recognized that if an agreement has terminated
before an arbitration award is granted, this does not prevent arbitration so
long as the grievance occurred during the period covered by the agreement.
The Court has also recognized that the union is the proper party to enforce
rights claimed by employees even though its collective bargaining agency may
have terminated. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S.
17 (1962). But cf. Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963). In
addition to claiming a survival of the contract grievance procedures, the union
claimed survival of "vested" substantive rights, see 313 F.2d 58 n.4, and Brief
for Respondent, pp. 21-37, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543
(1964), embracing both post-merger claims and claims accruing at a time beyond the term of the agreement. 376 U.S. at 545. See note 6 supra. The Court
noted that:
[T]he Union has framed its issues to claim rights not only "now"--after
the merger but during the term of the agreement-but also after the
agreement expired by its terms. .

.

. We see no reason why parties could

not if they so chose agree to the accrual of rights during the term of an
agreement and their realization after the agreement had expired.
376 U.S. at 554.
37. 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). The district court assumed, without deciding,
that the collective agreement survived the merger and that Wiley was bound
by its terms. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). The court nevertheless held that the union was not entitled
to demand arbitration since it "failed to avail itself of the procedures under the
contract which were a condition precedent to arbitration." Id. at 173. However,
the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in considering the issue of
"procedural arbitrability," i.e., that the arbitrator, not the court, should determine whether the union had adhered to the grievance procedure outlined in
the contract. 313 F.2d 52, 60-64 (2d Cir. 1963). As for "substantive arbitrability" it was not clear whether the Second Circuit had ruled on the issue or
had left the matter for the arbitrator. 376 U.S. at 546 n.1.
38. 376 U.S. at 546-47.
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may be required to arbitrate with the union under the
agreement3 9
The Court dismissed the contention that express consent was
necessary to bind Wiley. It reasoned that the federal policy
favoring settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, previously
invoked in the Trilogy to extend the scope of a general arbitration provision, 40 was equally applicable to support survival of
a duty to arbitrate. The Court indicated that countervailing
circumstances, which were not delineated, should be considered
in balancing the conflicting employer-employee interests. It
added, however, that the national policy in favor of arbitration
could be overcome only if such circumstances were compelling.4 1
It further noted that the union in Wiley had expressed its position on survival well in advance of the merger, thus eliminating
any substantial threat of unfairness or surprise to the purchas42
ing employer.
39. 376 U.S. at 548. The Court also considered the issue of procedural
arbitrability, see note 26 supra, and held that the arbitrator and not the Court
is the appropriate body to decide whether procedural prerequisites, which condition the duty to arbitrate, have been met 376 U.S. at 555-59. For a critical
analysis of this holding, see generally Comment, 73 YALE L.j. 1459 (1964).
See also Dunau, ProceduralArbitrability,A Question for the Court on Arbitration, 14 LAB. L.J. 1010 (1963); 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 553 (1964).
40. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580-85 (1960).
41. 376 U.S. at 549-50.
42. Id. at 551; accord, Polaner v. Gold Medal Grill, Inc., 52 Ohio Op. 282
117 N.E.2d 62 (1951) (purchaser of assets with notice bound by prior collective bargaining agreement). See generally, Gould, The Supreme Court and
Labor Law-An Analysis of Recent Trends, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 819, 821
(1965) where the irrelevancy of any "bargaining away concept" is noted.
Since the union will normally be expected to claim a survival or rights, it
does not seem likely that the courts will strictly require, as a condition for
survival, an active affirmance of a claim to rights expressly listed in the
agreement. However, courts should interpret an inconsistent position or apparent abandonment of any rights in the agreement as an estoppel to a later
attempt to enforce them if there is a showing of reasonable and detrimental
reliance. See 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 930-31 (1965). This rationale would also
apply to a case where a union presses claims based on unwritten past practices
or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement which are not apparent
from the text of the agreement. Thus, as to unlisted "rights" or past practices,
active affirmance would be necessary. Ibid.
This approach, requiring no notice for expressly listed rights, seems sensible
since in most cases it is difficult to tell from post-transfer negotiations which
party, if either, first suggests abandonment and renegotiation. See Wackenhut
Corp. v. International Plant Guard Workers, 55 L.R.R.M. 2554, 2556-58 (9th
Cir.), rav'd on rehearing, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964); compare Opening
Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-12, Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union Plant
Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
It is also interesting to speculate on the converse situations, where the employer has an advantageous contract and seeks to preserve it by giving notice
to the union of his intent to seek arbitration on the survival issues. Rationally,
the same criteria and requirements would apply since the policy of peaceful
settlement is the same in both cases. See 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 931 (1965).
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1. The Scope of Judicial Inquiry into Survival
Equally as important as the Court's action in finding the survival of a duty to arbitrate was its abstinence on the issue of
successorship-i.e., the question of what rights and duties actually survived to bind the successor. 43 The Court reached this
result by explicitly delegating a decision on the survival of substantive rights to the arbitrator.44 Indeed, this initial judicial
restraint was not unanticipated, since it evidences a continuation
of the patronage which the Court has recently given arbitration
as a substitute for industrial strife and as an integral part of
the collective bargaining process.4 5
2. The Scope of Business Transfers Subject to the Wiley Doctrine
In discussing the types of business transfers to which the
Wiley doctrine might apply--i.e., mergers, sales of assets, or
consolidations-the Court indicated that the appropriate circumstances warranting survival of the duty to arbitrate would
not be limited to the merger context. The Court pointed out
that the circumstances warranting the submission of survival
issues to arbitration would generally be present in all transfers
where one owner replaced another so long as the "business enterprise" remained substantially the same.46 Accordingly, the
Wiley rationale of business continuity was held applicable in a
recent Ninth Circuit case, Waelcenhut v. International Plant
Cuard Workers, 47 where the transfer of an entire corporate
business was accomplished through a sale of assets. 45 Similarly,
the Third Circuit was able to apply the Wiley doctrine in
United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc.,4 9 where the
43. 376 U.S. at 555.

44. Ibid. "Whether or not the Union's demands have merit will be determined

by the arbitrator in light of the fully developed facts." Ibid.

45. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
46 376 U.S. at 551.
47. Wackenhut Corp. v. International Plant Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.

1964).

48. Accord, McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113 (1965).
At the time of the sale each company was engaged in providing guard service
to oil and chemical plants. The principal assets acquired by Wackenhut were
leaseholds, customer lists and contracts, all assignable permits and licenses,
trade names and trademarks, and the company name. Wackenhut Corp. v.
International Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1964). See
notes 77-78 infra and accompanying text.
49. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.

1964).
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transfer was a divestiture through sale of assets by one of the
many manufacturing entities in a corporate giant.
In sum, it can be expected in arbitrability disputes following
transfers, as in disputes on the issues covered by a general arbitration clause, that the courts will resolve doubts on arbitrability
in favor of submission. This seems particularly appropriate
when it is recognized that the "business continuity" test employed in Wiley is probably nothing more than a jurisdictional
prerequisite to arbitration. 0 The result would also appear just,
in the last analysis, so long as judicial review is available to
determine that the arbitrator has not exceeded his remedial
authority and that his award has not produced violations of
controlling law."'
Yet, even with the broad jurisdictional test of Wiley, extreme
alterations in business operations should be recognized as sufficient to vitiate the duty to arbitrate.52 Since the cases subsequent to Wiley have involved similarly clear situations of business continuity however, the minimal elements of the continuity
test cannot be definitively enumerated at this time. 53 It appears,
50. See note 27 supra.
51. See Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE LJ. 1019 (1965).
The author summarizes this approach noting that "No great harm is done by
applying a liberal rule as to arbitrability, if the court carefully scrutinizes
what the arbitrator later decides." Id. at 1028.
52. 376 U.S. at 551. "We do not hold that in every case in which the ownership or corporate structure of an enterprise is changed the duty to arbitrate
survives." Ibid.
53. See Note, The Contractual Obligations of a Successor Employer Under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
914, 922-23 (1965). The author suggests that the courts may draw an analogy
from non-polar NLRB decisions, implementation of the Board's continuity test
on the question of whether a contract survives to act as a bar in a certification
proceeding. See notes 93-94 infra. This note lists five elements the Board
has considered in applying its continuity standard, namely: location of the
business, and similarities of personnel, supervision, equipment and mode of
operations. However, with valid analysis, the note suggests that location and
employment of the predecessor's employees should be eliminated as significant
factors in the Wiley test. Ibid.
A similar approach was adopted in McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247
F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). In determining the guide lines for implementing
the Supreme Court test of substantial identity in the business enterprise, the
court discounted the value of the factors of similar physical location of the
employing industry and the factor that employees are working in different
offices, with different supervisors. Id. at 118. After distinguishing the issues
in the analogous Board certification proceeding, the court concluded that the
relevant criteria were: (1) similarity of work performed by the employees;
(2) similarity in the employing industry; and (3) similarity in the employment relationship. Ibid.
The detail of these suggested criteria again raises the problem of where the
line should be drawn between the issues of jurisdiction and the merits, and how
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nevertheless, that in addition to the postulated case of union
abandonment through failure to give notice,5 4 there will be at
least three types of cases where the courts will find no duty to
arbitrate. The first will result when there has been a substantial
change in the business from the employees' point of view. This
might occur when, for example, the employees subsequently produce a substantially different product or when the employee
group has changed substantially. 55 Indeed the United Steelworkers conceded at the district court level in Reliance that none
of the contract provisions would survive if premises which had
been formerly used for making cement pipe were subsequently
used in a different type of business such as the manufacture of
chocolate candy.5 6
A second category of cases resulting in an abolition of the
duty was suggested by the AFL-CIO in its amicus curiae brief
in Wiley.57 This categorization involves changes primarily from
the viewpoint of the employer. The AFL-CIO suggested that
no duty to arbitrate would survive in the extreme case where
there was a transfer of assets to a trustee for liquidation or to
an auctioneer for sale. Since both transfers involve an anticipated cessation of business activity and disappearance of the
business entity prior to the transfer, the situation appears to be
by definition beyond the substantial continuity test advanced in
Wiley. A category based on a test involving a change in or disappearance of the business entity is often a vague one, s howfar a court may go in examining the facts in the pre-arbitration hearing.
Through its detailed examination and interpretation of the facts, the court may
in reality decide the merits of the grievance. Jones & Smith, The Supreme
Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcn.
L. REv. 751, 754 (1965). At least a determination of non-arbitrability has the

same effect as a determination on the merits. See Biggs, Assumption of Union
Contracts by Successors: Court Decisions and Arbitration Awards, 20 Ann.

J. 22, 30 (1965).
54. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.

55. 376 U.S. at 551; cf. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp.
113, 118-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).

56. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 843, 846
57. 376 U.S. at 555. "It is sufficient for present purposes that the demands
are not so plainly unreasonable that the subject matter of the dispute must be
regarded as non-arbitrable because it can be seen in advance that no award to
the Union could receive sanction." Ibid. See Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters
(W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 335 F2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).

Union, 246 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.H. 1965); Worcester Stamped Metal Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 234 F. Supp. 823 (D. Mass. 1964). In Worcester the

court ordered arbitration, reasoning that it could not be seen in advance that no
award to the union could receive judicial sanction.
58. Id. at 549-50, where the Court noted that denial of arbitration would
result "only if other considerations compellingly so demanded."

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLnA LAw RE[.vmw
[Vol. 18

ever, and it will undoubtedly be applied with caution by the
courts.
Notwithstanding the factual categorization, the issue for the
court at the pre-arbitration hearing becomes much like the issue
at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment-whether as
a matter of law on any finding of facts an arbitrator's award
for survival could be sustained.5 9 To deny arbitration, a court
would probably have to find that the policy of fostering industrial stability through arbitration is outweighed, not only by the
policy against burdening a business with obligations not reasonably suited to it, but rather by the very slight burden which the
successor must bear in defending the arbitration claim. With the
slight disadvantage to the successor and the great value of arbitration, factual situations warranting a denial of the duty on
this ground will probably be infrequent.60
A final category may well include several types of cases all
of which involve a conflict of law between the federal labor policy favoring arbitration and some supervening federal policy.
The best example of this category might occur following a transfer in a bankruptcy proceeding 1 where the business is sold as a
59. Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, pp. 12-13, John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
60. It is possible that such a test would create a loophole in the otherwise
broad Wiley coverage. An attempt to avoid the continuity standard might be
made by tailoring the form of the transaction. To do this the successor might
attempt to limit his purchases to certain assets. However, the loophole may
well be more apparent than real since in few cases would a successor interested
in acquiring a going concern be willing to risk dismantling and removing the
assets for a piece-meal purchase. Furthermore, the courts will undoubtedly
look with disfavor on such an attempted avoidance since by its very nature it
contradicts the goal of industrial stability. See 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 914, 935
(1965).
61. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(f), 76 Stat. 572 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 110(f)
(Supp. V, 1964); Bankruptcy Act § 70 (g), 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110 (g) (1958) ; General Orders in Bankruptcy 18, 305 U.S. 688 (1939).
The issue could also arise in a reorganization under Chapter X, see Bankruptcy Act §§ 111-17, 52 Stat. 884-85 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 511-17 (1958), or
an arrangement under Chapter XI, see Bankruptcy Act §§ 311-16, (1938).
In these situations, however, the successor is usually little more than the
alter ego of the predecessor. The courts apparently have the power, nevertheless, to approve a plan repudiating existing executory contracts. See Bankruptcy Act § 116(1), 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1958) (reor-

ganization) ; Bankruptcy Act § 313(1), 52 Stat. 906 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 713(1)
(1958)

(arrangements).

See also note 95 infra and accompanying text.
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going concern free from its labor contracts. 62 In this case the
trustee or the court has merely exercised its statutory power to
avoid the contracts of the bankrupt employer. Here, in a conflict
between federal statutory policy favoring creditors and a federal
common law favoring arbitration, the statutory policy obviously
prevails to bar arbitration of survival issues. By analogy, the
courts might also seek to resolve at the pre-arbitration hearing a
potential conflict between concurrent jurisdictions over the survival issues. Such a conflict might result from the dual jurisdictions of the arbitrator and the NLRB. 6 3 Since most of these conflicts are speculative at the pre-arbitration stage, however, judicial intervention will probably be delayed until the award has
produced an actual conflict. 64
C. Wiley Progeny-The Doctrine's Development and Epansion
As was noted above, the Wiley rationale was recently elaborated in United Steelworkers v. Reliance UniversalInc.65 There
Martin-Marietta, pursuant to an order by the Federal Trade
Commission, sold a concrete pipe plant as a going concern to
Reliance, who continued its operation substantially unchanged. 6
In an apparent effort to counteract the effect of a successor
clause67 in the outstanding bargaining agreement, the contract
of sale contained an express declaration that the "Buyer shall
not assume any obligation of the . .. [seller] under any collective bargaining agreement."6 The union disregarded this unilateral renunciation by Reliance and brought an action for
declaratory judgment. It raised the question whether the bar62. See Van Huffel v. Harelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931); Oppenheim, Sales
of Property in Bankruptcy Free and Clear of Encumbrances, 29 ILL. L. REy.
67 (1934). But cf. In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 361 (E.D.N.Y.
1965) (Railway Labor Act limits referee's right to disaffirm bargaining agree-

ment). See also Muskegon Motor Specialties Co. v. Davis, 313 F. 2d 841 (6th
Cir. 1963) where the court rather than the arbitrator determined the merits
of claims against a bankrupt employer.

63. See notes 83-94 infra and accompanying text.
64. Cf., e.g., McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113, 124-25

(E.D.N.Y. 1965); Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Union, 246 F. Supp. 252

(D.N.H. 1965); Worcester Stamped Metal Co. v. United Steelworkers, 234
F. Supp. 823 (D. Mass. 1964).

65. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F. 2d 891 (3d Cir.
1964).
66. Id. at 893. The court noted that subsequent to the transfer, Reliance
continued the operation "without significant change, employing substantially
all of the operating, supervisory, and managerial personnel who were formerly
employed."

Ibid.

67. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
68. Ibid.
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gaining agreement had survived the transfer, and, if so, whether
Reliance was required to submit issues on its application to
arbitration.0
The district court, in a decision rendered prior to Wiley, denied relief under section 301 on the theory that under common
law contract principles Reliance, as a stranger to the contract,
was not subject to its terms.70 After Wiley, however, the Third
Circuit reversed in a carefully worded opinion. The court viewed
Wiley as standing for the proposition that federal policy favoring amicable settlement of labor disputes by arbitration is so
strong "that the emerging federal common law of labor relations
requires a succeeding proprietor of a business to take the business
7
subject to a duty to arbitrate grievances." '
The court in Reliance reached the same result as had the Wiley
court in ordering arbitration, but its holding on the current
status of the collective bargaining agreement was significantly
different. The court held that the preexisting contract remained,
at least tentatively, "the basic charter of labor relations." 72 The
court however apparently gave the arbitrator power to avoid the
the agreement "giving weight to any change of circumstances
created by the transfer which may make adherence to any term
73
or terms of that agreement inequitable.
Although Reliance can probably best be interpreted as an application of Wiley rationale tempered by the procedural context
of a declaratory judgment, 74 it points to the area where expansion of the doctrine will probably first be attempted. That issue
involves the question of whether a court may rule conclusively
on the issue of rights survival. It will be recalled that the Court
in Wiley did not pass on the question of whether the various
substantive rights claimed by the union (other than the jurisdictional right to arbitration) actually survived the transfer. The
69. It appears that Reliance could have prevented the court from making
any ruling on the merits of survival by moving to stay the judicial proceeding
until an arbitrator had ruled on the matter. However, by failing to do this it
waived the right. Cf. E. T. Simonds Constr. Co. v. Local 1330, International
Hod Carriers, 315 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1963). Here the court held that when a
union unduly delayed a motion to stay an action for breach of a no-strike
clause pending arbitration, it waived its right to have the issue arbitrated.
Courts will usually grant a timely motion by a party to stay a legal proceeding
which is within the scope of the arbitration agreement E.g., Drake Bakeries
Inc, v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
70. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 227 F. Supp. 843, 845-46

(W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 335 F. 2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).

71. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 893 (3d

Cir. 1964).

72. Ibid.
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decision on survival of substantive rights was implicitly delegated to the arbitrator for his determination after a plenary
hearing on the merits. 7 5 The Court's opinion did leave in doubt,
however, the proper disposition of cases arising out of different
factual contexts. It seems fairly certain, therefore, that unions
will point generally to the federal labor policy favoring industrial peace and urge that Wiley means subsequent employers are
automatically bound by obligations contained in outstanding
agreements. Thus, they will argue, all that remains for an arbitrator is to interpret terms and apply the agreement to a particular occurrence." 6

Surprisingly enough this position finds support in the Ninth
Circuit's recent decision in Wackenhut Corp. v. International
Plant Guard Workers. 7 Here the court held that the prior agreement survived in its totality and interpreted Wiley to mean:
[W]here there is substantial similarity of operation and continuity of identity of the business enterprise before and after
a change in ownership, a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration provision, entered into by the predecessor employer is binding upon the successor employer.78
Nevertheless, McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 79 the most
recent and in many respects the most thorough lower court in73. Ibid.

74. See note 69 supra.
75. 376 U.S. at 552-55.
76. Wackenhut Corp. v. International Plant Guard Workers, 332 F2d 954,
958 (9th Cir. 1964).
77. Ibid.
78. Id. at 958. The prior employer had entered into a collective agreement
with a union which provided for grievance arbitration as the final and binding
step in the grievance procedure. During its term, Wackenhut purchased substantially all of the assets of the business to effect a horizontal combination.
Wackenhut invited General Plant employees to apply for employment and there
was a substantial continuity of supervisory personnel. Nevertheless, Wackenhut pointed out that it had not expressly assumed General Plant's labor obligations and refused to abide by the agreement or to submit the issue to grievance
arbitration. However, the district court found that Wackenhut had expressly
agreed to be bound and ordered arbitration. Id. at 955-57. The court of appeals reversed the district court in an opinion prior to Wiley, but on rehearing
after Wiley, it affirmed on the basis of the policy considerations in Wiley.
Wackenhut Corp. v. International Plant Guard Workers, 55 L.R.R.M. 2554
(9th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
79. 247 F. Supp. 113 (1965). In this action, Teamster Local 553, representing the employees of the predecessor, Weber-Quinn, sued the subsequent employer, Humble, to compel arbitration of some twenty-six grievances. Humble
had purchased the assets and business of Weber-Quinn, a fuel oil distributor,
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terpretation of Wiley, augurs strongly for a limited judicial role.
Although the transfer involved problems of unit intermingling
even more complex than those in Wiley, the court found compliance with the Wiley substantial continuity test. Accordingly,
it ordered Humble, the successor, to arbitrate twenty-six grievances.A0 In addition to an order requiring arbitration, the plaintiff, a Teamster local, had requested that Humble be enjoined
from disregarding the agreement pending arbitration. The court
refused the injunctive relief since it was, in effect, a request for
specific performance of the bargaining provisions. The court
concluded, quoting at length from Reliance, that the continued
validity of the various provisions was clearly a matter for the
arbitrator's determination. 81 Thus, a ruling on the issue of specific performance would clearly "usurp the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator." 2
It can be argued that the desire for short-term industrial stability, which in part underlies Wiley, taken alone supports automatic survival. A careful reading of 'Wiley demonstrates, however, that the Court's sole concern was the duty to arbitrate.
Furthermore, the goal of short-term industrial stability is
achieved regardless of which body--court or arbitrator-decides
the issues of survival. The Court has long noted its preference
for arbitration, and extensive judicial participation in the interpretation of collective argreements prior to arbitration would
contravene much of the Court's endorsement of the procedure.
Thus, to the extent that the Court regards arbitration as an inand had integrated the acquired operation into its existing distribution system.
The Teamster-Weber-Quinn bargaining agreement ran until December 1965.
The Teamsters gave Humble timely notice of its representational status and
requested that Humble adopt the agreement. Humble refused, stating it was not
bound since the Weber-Quinn unit had disappeared and since the Weber-Quinn

employees were now members of the Humble unit by accretion, all rights
under the old contract had disappeared. Humble's employees were represented
by an independent, the Industrial Employees Association, and their bargaining
agreement ran until April 30, 1966.
In an attempt to resolve the dispute, Humble instituted an NLRB unit
clarification proceeding prior to the district court decision. The Board ruled
that the employees of Weber-Quinn had become members of the Humble unit.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1965).
Although the court recognized the problems which would confront the arbitrator because of the prior Board ruling, 247 F. Supp. at 116 n.l., the court found
under the Wiley continuity test that the duty to arbitrate had survived. The
court reasoned that survival of the duty was not inconsistent with the Board's
determination on unit status since the union did not lose the right to arbitrate
merely as a result of the disappearance of the employer or the old bargaining
unit.
80. 247 F. Supp. at 120-21.
81. Id. at 125-26.
82. Id. at 127.
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formal, inexpensive, expeditious forum and the arbitrator as
the adjudicator more likely to comprehend the parties' relative
interests, long-term industrial stability can best be achieved by

initial judicial abstention on the merits of survival.
III.

CoNTRAcT ARBRoATIO
AND THE Su VIvAL oF RiGH~sS-NEw
PROBiEmS Pon Tim ARBITRATOnS

A. Potential NLRB-Arbitrator Conflict
Since imposition of a duty to arbitrate after a transfer will
forestall possible strikes, the immediate result of Wiley has been
the achievement of short-run industrial stability. The long-run
effect of Wiley and the influence it will have on overall industrial stability and economic growth depends to a large extent on
the manner in which individual arbitrators exercise their broad
powers. While the Court expressed confidence that the arbitrator's expertise would yield fair and equitable results, inherent in
his new powers are additional pitfalls to achieving that goal.
Not the least of these hazards is the potential conflict between
the NLRB and arbitrators which may result from their concurrent, and often simultaneous, jurisdiction over related questions

of survival.83 This dual jurisdiction may occasionally produce
problems following simple transfers, such as that in Waceenhut
or Reliance, where both employee and manufacturing units remained unchanged. The most serious problems are likely to arise,
however, from "intermingling" situations such as in Wiley and
Humble. 4 Intermingling results when, following a merger or a
83. Cf. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (arbitrator
has concurrent jurisdiction with NLRB on issue involving determination of
bargaining unit) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962);
McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113, 121-23 (E.D.N.Y.
1965). Compare Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
325 F.2d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 903, cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 379 U.S. 26 (1964). See Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63
MIcH. L. REv. 751, 795 (1965) where the authors conclude that a party having
a contractual remedy as well as one before the Board arguably is entitled to
pursue both. But see Kentile, Inc. v. Local 456, United Rubber Workers, 228
F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (arbitration enjoined pending final determination of issue by the Board).
84. 376 U.S. at 551-52 n.5; McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F.
Supp. 113, 121-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Both courts noted that problems would
clearly result if the arbitral award resulted in special treatment to the employees of the predecessor since they had now been absorbed into a different
representational unit. Ibid. The Second Circuit in Wiley had suggested that
this problem of special treatment might be resolved by a fair lump sum settlement. 313 F.2d 59 n.5
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consolidation, there is an integration of the predecessor's employees into the successor's preexisting operational unit.s5 While
Wiley involved two sets of employees, one of which was represented by a union, Humble involved an infinitely more complex
situation of intermingling where the two sets of employees were
represented by rival unions.
In any of the above situations either prior or subsequent to
an arbitral ruling on survival of contract rights, the Board may
be called on to determine the employer's duty to bargain with
the union or rival unions.8 0 Here the Board must decide whether
the successor is bound by a bargaining agreement of the predecessor so as to bar an election during its stated term. The hearing will thus involve a determination of the status of a union as
bargaining agent 8 7 and thereby the status of the bargaining
agreement as a bar to a representation proceeding. If the arbitrator's criteria for determinating survival are materially different from those applied by the Board difficulties are inevitable.
For example, the Board on one hand, might determine that the
prior agreement did not operate as a contract bar, thus permitting a new election. On the other hand, the arbitrator could then
determine that current contractual rights and duties had survived the transfer. With the findings of the Board, a newly
certified union representing all employees could then obtain an
agreement with the subsequent employer setting forth rights and
duties entirely different from those which the arbitrator had
found survived under the agreement with the prior employer.
Arguably, the employees of the acquired business would then
85. See Gould, The Supreme Court and Labor Law-An Analysis of Recent
Trends, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 823 (1965); 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 914 (1965).
86. The NLRB is most often confronted by the question of contract survival

indirectly when a petition for an election certifying or decertifying a union or
a petition for unit clarification is filed. If the Board finds that the contract

survived, it will act as a bar to an election. See generally, Contract Bar to

Representation Elections, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REy. 450 (1960); Freidin, The
Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLUm. L. Rnv. 61 (1959); Smith,

Establishing the Collective Bargaining Relationship under the Labor Manage-

inent Relations Act, 1947, 6 S.C.L.Q. 429 (1954).

Apparently the only situation where the NLRB can decide the issue of contract survival directly is in a hearing involving an unfair labor practice for

making an illegal bargaining agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958) ; Argo
Steel Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1959). Otherwise, the Board has no
jurisdiction over contracts per se. See also note 88 infra.
87. In such litigation, the union which had a bargaining agreement with the
prior employer will argue that the subsequent employer is bound by the agreement. The union petitioning for election, which may be an outside union or
a union representing some of the employees of the successor employer, will
argue that the prior contract is not binding and therefore not a bar to a new
election.
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have an election and could choose the superior of the newly contracted or the survived rights.""
Similar problems of seeming inconsistency might result if,
under the foregoing assumptions, the union in the acquiring firm
retains its status in a reconstituted bargaining unit. If the employees of the acquired firm enjoyed superior rights under a
survived agreement, the union might have difficulty bargaining
with the successor employer both at negotiation and in the
administration of the agreement. Even if the incumbent union
felt concessions to the employer were warranted, this would
involve an unduly serious loss of face to a rival union. The confusion would certainly be inimical to the successor's labor-management relations and might involve a violation of the principle
that a union is entitled to recognition because of its majority
89
status.
It is clear that in order to avert such conflict some correlation
between the activities of the NLRB and individual arbitrators
is essential. This is true even though in many cases, the conflict
will be avoided since both bodies will defer to the rulings of the
90
other.
88. The preferential treatment of a predecessor's employees could conceivably result in a § 8(a) (3) unfair labor practice charge of discrimination by the
successor's employees against the successor employer. See 113 U. PA. L. Rv.
914, 926 n. 59 (1965). See also Electrical Workers v. Illinois Power Co.,
52 CCH LAB. L. REP. 16, 806 (7th Cir. 1965). Here the court held the employer could not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute over reclassification of
certain employees as supervisors after the union had raised the representation
issue in an NLRB hearing. The court reasoned that the possibility of conflict
between the Board's determination as to the supervisory status of the employees
and the award of the arbitrator warranted the denial of arbitration.
89. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944). See
also Local 453, IUE v. Otis Elevator Co., 201 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
rev'd, 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
90. Although not bound by an arbitrator's award even though it purports to
promote the policy of promoting industrial stability and peace, the Board will
often defer to such an award. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962) ; Spielberg Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
See generally McCullock, Arbitration and/or the NLRB, 18 AiB. J.3 (1963).
This acceptance is customary unless the arbitration procedure is unfair, irregular, or the decision is repugnant to the purpose and policies of the labor acts.
See Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961) where the Board refused to
defer to an award dismissing an employee for engaging in protected activity.
In International Harvester the Board dismissed a complaint charging unfair
labor practices under §§ 8(a) (3) and (1) and §§ 8(b) (2) and (1) (A). Without passing on the merits, the Board found that the trial examiner had erred
in not honoring a prior arbitration award which had reduced an employee's
seniority because of nonpayment of dues under the union-security provisions
of the collective agreement. The Board reached this result noting that it was
"well established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect an
arbitration award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair
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This inter-body deference will result in a greater avoidance
of conflict, however, if a correlation between the standards on
survival employed by the NLRB and arbitrators is developed.
In such a development it would seem appropriate for an arbitrator in determining whether particular contractual rights survive to proceed in substantially the same fashion that the NLRB
has in developing the contract bar doctrine. 9' In performing its
function, the NLRB has been motivated principally by a desire
to promote industrial stability92-the precise responsibility that
Wiley places on individual arbitrators. The test evolved by the
Board turns on the question of whether a business transfer renders a bargaining agreement ineffective as a stabilizing force.
In examining the merits of survival, the Board considers the
effect of a business transfer on both the employer, who may
have substantially discontinued the operations of his predecessor,0 3 and the union, which may no longer properly represent the
labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act."
138 N.L.R.B. at 925-26. The Board also relied on § 203(e) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 which provides that "final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement" Id. at 926.
In the converse situation where the Board has established its jurisdiction over
alleged unfair labor practices and a party subsequently institutes arbitration
proceedings on the same issue, federal courts have on occasion stayed arbitration proceedings pending a final determination by the Board. See Kentile
Inc. v. Local 456, United Rubber Workers, 228 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Although on the facts of International Harvester the issues before the arbitrator and the Board were identical, similar reasoning would seem to apply
where the issue before the Board is one of contract bar and the issue before
the arbitrator is one of survival of contractual rights and duties. This should
not be affected by the fact that unfair labor practice allegations involve §§ 8
and 10 of the act, while the doctrine of contract bar is an adjunct of § 9.
91. In a similar context Professor, recently Solicitor General, Cox has noted
the guiding applicability which judicial precedents may have for arbitrators,
stating that:
Many legal rules have hardened into conceptual doctrines which lawyers
invoke with little thought for the underlying reasons, but the doctrine
themselves represent an accumulation of tested wisdom, they are bottomed
upon notions of fairness and sound public policy...
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1958).
As for the precedent value which one arbitration award should have on a
subsequent one, see notes 109-14 infra and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); L. B.
Spear & Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 687, 689 (1953).
93. Until recently, the NLRB has generally taken the view, with respect to
the employer, that unless the new owner is in effect the alter ego of the previous one, he is not bound by the pre-existing agreement. See, e.g., Herman
Loewenstein Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (1947). Compare M. B. Farrin Lumber
Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 575 (1957) (contract binding where transfer of ownership
accomplished by sale of stock notwithstanding new management), %vithAmeri-
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employee group.9 4 In either case, there may be no reasonable
basis for continuing the former bargaining relationship.
However, the desire for uniformity is not a goal in itself and
should not require blind adoption by arbitrators of the rules
presently enforced by the Board. Upon re-examination, these
rules may fail to fully effectuate the arbitrator's objective in
particular situations. Thus, it seems unlikely that all conflicts
in this area will be avoided. Rather it is probable that the judicican Concrete Pipe Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 720 (1960) (new owner not bound by
prior contract where he acquired business through purchase of assets notwithstanding rehiring of prior employees) ; Jolly Giant Lumber Co., 114 N.L.R.B.
413 (1955); and Southwestern Greyhound Lines Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1014

(1955).

This rather mechanical approach to survival from the standpoint of the employer has been seriously criticized by unions. See Brief for AFL-CIO as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 16-22 & n.5, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543 (1964). However, there are growing indications that the Board may change
its position and, like the Supreme Court in Wiley, approach survival in terms
of business continuity with less emphasis on the form of the transfer. See
Grainger Bros. Co., 55 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1964); Farrin Lumber Co., 117
N.L.R.B. 575 (1957). This trend was particularly apparent in Maintenance
Inc., where the Board stated:
The duty of an employer who has taken over an "employing industry"
to honor the employees' choice of bargaining agent is not one that derives from a private contract, nor is it one that necessarily turns upon
the acquisition of assets or assumption of other obligations usually incident to a sale, lease, or other arrangement between employers. It is a
public obligation arising by operation of the Act. The critical question
is not whether Respondent succeeded to White Castle's [the employer]
corporate identity or physical assets, but whether Respondent continued
essentially the same operation, with substantially the same employee unit
whose duly certified bargaining representative was entitled to statutory
recognition ...

148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1964). See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
247 F. Supp. 113, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) where the court observed that due
to the impact of Wiley, the Board may very well have begun to reexamine its
entire § 9 procedure. In the process, it may have overruled many time-honored
precedents. Id.
94. Even if the Board determines that a change in ownership warrants the
contract's survival as a bar, a change in the nature of the business operation
from the employees" point of view may also preclude survival. See, e.g.,
General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958). This occurs when there
has been a material alteration in the unit covered by the contract, thus destroying the union's representative status as a bargaining agent. Id. at 1167-68. See
also Sheets & McKay, 92 N.L.R.B. 179 (1950). For example, in order for a
merger (or consolidation) to effect a sufficient change in the bargaining unit to
remove the contract as a bar, the merger must create an entirely new operation
with major personnel changes. Although this condition is not satisfied where
the transferred employees retain the same or comparable jobs, when a merger
results in the integration of facilities to the extent that employees are intermingled without any distinction as to the work they formerly performed, a
prior contract will not bar an election. L.B. Spear & Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 687
(1953). Similarly, where the integration of different plants reduces one of
the original employee complements covered by contract to a fraction of the resulting enlarged complement, see e.g. Industrial Stamping & Mfg. Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 1038 (1953), or where the number of former employees presently
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ary will be called on periodically to exercise its supervisory
function and resolve conflicting results.
B. Arguments for Survival-New Procedural and Evidentiary
Problems for the Arbitrators
1. Questions of the Parties'Intents
While arbitrators have been granted broad powers their discretion is not absolute.9" Since the court will overturn an award
if it does not draw its "essence of the agreement," 0 the arbitrator
must always carefully scrutinize the document. The problem of
survival by definition, however, does not involve situations where
the agreement contains express declarations of intent. This fact
does not mean that the arbitrator is precluded from examining
the agreement to find the parties' implied intent or from considering extrinsic evidence to discover that intent.9 7 Indeed it
needed is substantially reduced due to the permanent abandonment and reconstruction of the separate original facilities, see Michigan-California Lumber Co.,
96 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1951), an outstanding contract will not survive to bar an
election petition.
Changes other than mergers or consolidations which may materially alter the
employees' bargaining unit are (1) the addition of a new product which constitutes a "wholly new business venture," see Mitchell Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B.
1268 (1946), or (2) the severance and removal of a department from an
original plant to a separate geographical location when there is no more than
a slight interchanging of employees and equipment, see General Elec. Co., 84
N.L.R.B. 150 (1949).
95. See 376 U.S. at 551-52 n.5, 555; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Compare Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959) and Summers, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1952), with Jalet, Judicial Review of
Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Jones &
Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging
FederalLaw, 63 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1965); Jones & Smith, Management and
Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with
Connents, 62 Mica. L. REv. 115 (1964); Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965); and Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need, 5 DE PAUL L. REV. 14 (1955). See generally Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining,
28 U. Cnr. L. REV. 464 (1961); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1962); Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962).
96. "[H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
97. But cf. Torrington Co. v. UAW, 242 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1964).
The court held that the past practice of granting one hour paid voting time
was no longer a part of the common law of the shop when that benefit had
been debated at the bargaining session, and the parties' final agreement made
no provision for continuation of the practice.
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may be that unless such an investigation has been made any
award rendered would be subject to judicial avoidance.98
Because of the usual sparsity of evidence on intent, arbitrators
will certainly be faced with the claim that the presence or absence of a so-called successor clause99 conclusively establishes the
intent of the parties concerning the obligations of a subsequent
employer. It will be recalled that although the Wiley contract
did not contain such a clause, this fact received little more than
summary notice by the Court. This treatment accords with the
Court's ruling that the source of the survived duty to arbitrate
was the general arbitration clause. The Court's treatment does
not mean that an arbitrator should consider a survival clause
immaterial. Quite the contrary, the presence or absence of this
clause should be quite relevant to a determination of the survival of substantive rights other than the duty to arbitrate. In
situations where no successor clause is present there may be no
other credible evidence as to the actual intent of the parties.
Furthermore, the labor history of the shop will seldom evidence
a similar previous transfer. Thus if the agreement contains no
survival clause and there is no indication of the parties' intent,
the arbitrator might best effect long-run stability by finding that
no current rights survive.
Related to the question of intent is the collateral issue of the
scope of an arbitrator's power to alter an agreement. Since an
arbitrator must draw his authority from the agreement and the
intent of the parties incorporated therein, it has been suggested
that his power might include authority to modify, by reduction
or avoidance, an existing term. 100 Such power might be exercised
in situations such as Reliance or one involving the sale of a failing business. Here, in determining the issue of survival of established wage rates and fringe benefits, the arbitrator might reduce them in the interest of long-term industrial stability. 0 1
Some have suggested that the arbitrator's powers might include
98. Cf. Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960) (procedural due process includes right of
employee to appear at arbitration when union has adverse interest in outcome).
99. See note 14 supra.
100. See United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 325 F.2d 891, 895

(1964).
101. Ibid.
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the positive authority to create terms.10 2 Thus, if a small, impecunious firm or a failing business was merged into a prosperous, large producer, an arbitrator might conceivably order
an increase in wage rates or additional fringe benefits. It is obvious however, on reflection, that deviation in either direction
from the express terms of an agreement, while possibly following
the unexpressed intent of one party, would seldom achieve a
result mutually anticipated by the parties. 0 3 The arbitrator
might avoid this logical impasse, however, by finding that although the parties had no fixed intent as to an ultimate result,
102. Cf. 376 U.S. at 552 n.5. Professor Wellington has summarized what
he sees as a trend in this direction in Judicial Review of Promises to Arbitrate,
37 N.Y.L.U. Rnv. 471 (1962):
[L]abor arbitration may not always be a dispute settlement technique
that relies solely on pre-existing standards and norms found in a collective bargaining agreement and in the common law of an enterprise.
Sometimes arbitration may be a technique that relies upon considerations
of expediency for preserving industrial peace and keeping everyone as
happy as possible. This may mean that the arbitrator will give less than
full attention to the terms of the agreement or the common law of the
enterprise. This may be what the parties expect when they choose their
arbitrator.
Id. at 482. See also Chamberlain, Work Assignments and Industrial ChangeJob Security, Management Rights, and Arbitration, in LABOR ARBiTRArowPERspEcurvEs AND PROBLEMS 235, 237-40 (Kahn ed. 1964).
103. See Chamberlain, Work Assignments and Industrial Change-Job Security, Management Rights, and Arbitration in LABOR AMBITRATION-PERPECTIVES
AND PROBLEMS 235, 237-40 (Kahn ed. 1964). Compare Chamberlain, op. cit.
supra, with Seward, Work Assignments and Industrial Change-Reexamining
Traditional Concepts in LABOR ARBITRATION-PERSPEcTIVES AND PROBLEMS
240-51 (Kahn ed. 1964). While both authors recognize the business needs for
both stability and change in labor-management relations, their approaches are
quite different. Chamberlain prefers solving the problems by giving arbitrators
broad discretion at "interpretation" of the agreement, so long as there is evidence of the parties' basic intent. He concluded:
I suggest that the agreement incorporatesthe surrounding relevant circumstances at the time it was negotiated, and that when such relevant
circumstances have changed, the clause-even though it remains in the
agreement-necessarily takes on a different meaning which the arbitrator
can interpret when he is asked to do so. And the injunction found in
many agreements that the arbitrator may not add to or change the content of the agreement should not-I am tempted to say cannot-rob him
of that authority of fresh interpretation.
Chamberlain, op. cit. supra at 235.
Seward, on the other hand, favors a more literal interpretation, with problems of business change and stability to be resolved through continuous collective bargaining. He concludes that:
If there is to be a mutual effort of both unions and management satisfactorily to adjust to change and the need for change, if there is to be
the hard and constructive thinking that there must be, if the labor
agreements are to provide both adequate flexibility and adequate security, this is, I think, where continuous collective bargaining should start.
Seward, op. cit. supra at 251.
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both intended the arbitrator to resolve the dispute in light of the
change in circumstances. 10 4
While a flexible approach, premised upon the expertise of the
arbitrator, seems best calculated to effect a just result, arbitrators should not be permitted to justify a complete departure from
their role as interpreters of the collective agreement solely on
equitable grounds.10 5 Indeed, it is questionable whether courts
would approve such positive action absent strong evidence of the
parties' actual intents. In any event, it is clear that if an arbitrator is willing to assume the power to alter terms without a
clear manifestation of intent, his disposition of the problem in
such a discretionary and original manner will more closely resemble contract arbitration than grievance arbitration.
2. Precedent Value of Court Decisions-A Problem of Uniformity and Predictability
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt an answer to
the multitudinous problems which will face arbitrators in ruling
104. See note 5 supra. Contract containing the general restriction that the
arbitrator may not alter or add to the agreement may limit this discretion.
Metal Products Workers Union v. Torrington Co., 242 F. Supp. 813 (D.Conn.
1965). About 509 of all bargaining agreements providing for arbitration contain such restrictions. BuREAu oF NAT'L AFFARs, BASIC PATTFRNS IN UNION
CONTRAcTS 51:9 (5th ed. 1961).
In Torrington the court refused to enforce an award citing the following
provision in the agreement: "The arbitrator shall be bound by and must comply
with all of the terms of this agreement and he shall have no power to add to,
delete from, or modify, in any way, any of the provisions of this agreement. ..."
242 F. Supp at 817 n.3. But cf. Desert Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General
Sales Drivers Union, 335 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1964) (broad power of interpretation implied); Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Union, 246 F. Supp. 252
(D.N.H. 1965); see Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute
Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MicH. L. REV. 751, 801-03 (1965)
(limitations should be "clear and specific provisions" before court should attempt to "second guess" arbitrator).
105. As a general rule arbitrators have been reluctant to find that rights survived against the subsequent employer. E.g., C.M.F. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 980
(Kates 1962); Di Giorgio Wine Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 746 (Jones 1957); cf.
United Packers Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (Kelliher 1962). But cf. Walker Bros.,
41 Lab. Arb. 844, 848 (Crawford 1963); see St. Antoine, Contract Enforcement and the Courts, 15 LAB. L.J. 583, 589 (1964) (wide substantive applications of Wiley predicted-collective agreement "will run with the enterprise").
In C.M.F. Co. a successor clause covering sale of the "operation" did not
create survival rights when the transfer was a sale of physical assets and resulted in no continuation of the prior activities. In Walker Bros., a survival
clause was found to warrant survival of rights in an interim award which the
successor employer was required to act as surety for performance of duties
for which the predecessor remained primarily liable. However, the final award
was made contingent on the outcome of a related NLRB proceeding.
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on the merits of survival in particular situations. 0 6 The question
of the value as precedents to be given court holdings on identical
issues of survival does warrant discussion however. This body
of court-made law is evolving from situations where a bargaining
agreement contains no grievance provision or, for some other
reason, no resort is had to arbitration. 10 7 In these situations, a
court is called on to resolve the dispute in an action brought
under section 301. Accordingly, judges may decide exactly the
same issues that arbitrators decide.10 s
Most commentators agree that the need for predictability of
result within a particular bargaining relationship warrants an
application of the principle of stare decisis within that unit. 10 9
There is little agreement among arbitrators, however, on the
value of decisions on related facts from another bargaining relationship." 0 Arbitrators as a general rule have adamantly denied that they are bound by either arbitral or judicial precedents."' However, a federal judge has summarized the position
that arbitrators should follow court decisions, noting that unless
they do,
the courts will be . . . faced with the anomaly of enforcing
in one case the uniform federal law fashioned in the courts
• . . and on the same issue in the next case enforcing awards
2
of arbitrators at variance with that law."1
While either position can and has been defended," 8 it seems
likely that the position advocating uniformity will ultimately
prevail." 4 And if it does, this will afford an added basis for
seeking judicial review of an arbitral award.
106. See note 105 supra.
107. See notes 108, 153 infra and accompanying text.
108. Although such cases have been infrequent in the past, it is possible that
over a period of time federal courts will develop a sizeable body of federal
common law on the incidents of survival.
109. See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisn of

the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MicH. L. REv. 1115,
1150-52 (1964).
110. Ibid.
111. E.g., United Packers Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (Kelliher 1962). But see
Justin, Arbitration: Proving Your Case, 10 Lab. Arb. 955, 968 (1948).
112. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1022 (1965).
113. See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms

of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 Micir. L. Rav. 1115,
1150-53 (1964).
114. Cf., e.g., Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(federal law fashioned under § 301 must be paramount and uniform).
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6. Judicial Review for Wiley Awards?
The ascendance of arbitration as a substitute for litigation and
for the bargaining-strike process in settling labor disputes has
raised many questions concerning the role of the courts in arbitration. Traditionally, courts have become involved in arbitration at two stages-namely, prior to arbitration or subsequent
to the granting of an award. In the pre-arbitration phase, a
court is most often called on to determine the issue of arbitrability, i.e., the issue of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to hear the
dispute." 5 This inquiry is a limited one, and commentators are
in substantial agreement as to the wisdom of limiting the inquiry
at this stage to the jurisdictional issue.116
The second phase of intervention may occur after an award
is rendered and will -result when a party seeks to avoid or to
obtain enforcement of the award. It is at this post-arbitral phase
where a new confrontation between the arbitrator and the courts
is now developing. 117 This confrontation is due in part to a growing sentiment that the Court's "romanticisms" ' l in the Trilogy
expounding the virtues of arbitration may in fact be subject to
severe limitations." 9 There has been a resurgence of judicial
interest in the grievance process and the judiciary has reasserted
an expertise and competency for dealing with labor disputes
1 20
equal to, and in many ways superior to, that of arbitrators.
Commentators have also suggested the superior ability of the
115. "The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective
bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty." John Wiley & Sons v.

Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964). See Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court

and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REv.
751, 753 (1965). See note 26 supra.
116. See, e.g., Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019,
1027 (1965) ; Sipser, Arbitration and the Courts: Arbitrability, Forum Shopping, and Public Policy, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. LAE. 319, 325 (1963) ; Smith, Arbitrability---The Arbitrator, the Courts, and the Parties, 17 ARB. J. 3, 15 (1962).
117. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965).
118. Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 901

(1960).
119. See, e.g., Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, in LABOR

AND PROBLEMS 53-55 (Kahn ed. 1964); Hays,
The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1034-38 (1965) ; Jones &
Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MICHr. L. REv. 1115, 1146-52 (1964); 16 SYRAcusE L.
AaBITRATION-PERSPECTIVE

Rxv. 545, 566 (1965).

120. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965);
Sipser, Arbitration and the Courts: Arbitrability,Forum Shopping, and Public
Policy, 16 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 319, 323 (1963).
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of result in the
judiciary to more nearly insure uniformity
21
developing common law of labor relations.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in many situations postarbitration judicial review is coming to be recognized as a means
for attacking an arbitrator's award. 1 22 While review of the award
on the "merits" will probably continue to be shunned, there are
several general areas where review has been obtained that are of
particular relevance for attacking Wiley awards. One such attack has been based on the general argument that an arbitrator's
award is unforceable because he exceeded his remedial authority
or disregarded other limitations in the agreement. 23 This attack
would seem particularly appropriate in Wiley situations where
an award varies any term of the original agreement.
Judicial review has also been recognized where an award is
contrary to some legal limitations on the arbitrator's remedial
authority. It has recently been suggested that such an attack
might include any of at least five general arguments, including
the claims:
(1) that the arbitrator decided an issue not submitted; (2)
that the award requires a violation of federal or state statute; (3) that the award, although not requiring an illegal
act, is inconsistent with public policy; (4) that the arbitrator, in analyzing the issue presented under the labor agreement, disregarded or misapplied some principle of federal
substantive law relating to the labor agreement; (5) that
fundamental principles of due process were violated in the
1 24
conduct of the hearing.

Of these arguments, claims two, three, and four appear most
pertinent in the 'Wiley context. As has been noted, in the area
121. See Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1022-23

(1965).

122. See cases cited Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J.
1019 (1965); Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging FederalLazo, 63 MicH. L. REV. 751, 801-06 (1965).
123. E.g., Local 784, Truck Drivers Union v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562
(8th Cir. 1964) ; Torrington Co. v. UAW, 242 F. Supp. 824 (D.Conn. 1965) ;
Leeds & Northrup Co. v. Leeds & Northrup Employees' Union, 52 CCH LAB.
L. REP. 1P 16, 766 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965) ; cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. United Steelworkers, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964) ; see Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court
and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. REV.
751, 800-02 (1965).
124. Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration:
The Enterging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 751, 803 (1965) ; see Kollsman
Instrument Corp. v. Crivelli, 52 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1P 51, 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct,
App. Div. 1965) (award set aside when arbitrator passed on matter not submitted).
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of NLRB-arbitrator encounter there is a strong argument that
a court should set aside any award to which the Board would
not defer. 125 These arguments are also available to seek judicial
resolution of court-arbitrator conflict. Finally, the claim that an
award violates "public policy" may open a Pandora's Box and
suggests numerous approaches for attacking an award. 126 In
conclusion, while the exact limits of post-arbitral judicial review
are still undefined, this procedure may often be available to at1 27
tack an undesirable award.

IV. Ppx-TRA-,\,sFm
OF

BARGAnING:

A Possmsi

RsOLuTiON

A BusnEss In-AssE

As suggested above, unless the effect of a transfer is positively
delineated in a collective argreement, the issue of rights survival
will in all probability be resolved by arbitration. In effect, this
125. Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, Ladies Garment Workers, 283 F.2d 936
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); cf. Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) ; see Nays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1027 (1965).
The Court in Carey noted that "should the Board disagree with the arbitrator, .

.

. the Board's ruling would, of course, take precedence ...

U.S. at 272.

"

375

126. See, e.g., NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (public
interest in efficient economic system); Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, United
Steelworkers, 341 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3111
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1965); Local 453, Electrical Workers v. Otis Elevator Co.,
314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) ; United Steelworkers
v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 893 (anti-trust policies).
127. A good summary of this problem states:
In this area the ultimate answers, for the most part, seem to us to be
unclear. The basic question is whether the Court, in discharging its
role of superintendence of the development of emerging federal law concerning the collective bargaining agreement, will determine for reasons
of policy that arbitral as well as judicial decisions should be in conformity with principles approved by the Court. An affirmative view would
place issues of this kind in a special category to be differentiated from
other kinds of alleged errors of contract interpretation, fact, or law
with respect to which the orthodox rule of non-reviewability would obtain. In view of the relatively high degree of involvement of arbitrators,
rather than courts, in the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements and the importance the Court evidently attaches to
the development of an appropriate conceptualization of the collective
agreement, we think it would regard some of these issues as fundamental and subject to judicial review ...
Jones & Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 751, 806 (1965).
It has been suggested that a common law development recognizing judicial
review may fail to materialize, and legislative action may ultimately be necessary to increase the scope of judicial review of arbitration proceedings. See
Smith, Arbitrability-The Arbitrators, the Courts, and the Parties, 17 ARD. J.
3, 15-16 (1962).
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permits an arbitrator to make a finding ranging from a complete
survival of rights to no survival at all.

The consequent uncertainty which surrounds the arbitrator's
powers has been criticized by both unions and employers. The
problems that may develop from such uncertainty are well illustrated by the situation in Reliance.12 1 There, Martin-Marietta
sold its plant to Reliance to comply with a divestiture order
issued by the Federal Trade Commission. Martin-Marietta had
practiced company-wide bargaining and because of the economics
inherent in its large scale operation was able to offer greater
concessions to labor than could a small competitor like Reliance.
The purchase from Martin-Marietta had been made prior to the
Wiley decision, and Reliance contended that had it been aware
of the possible survival of Martin-Marietta's wage obligations
neither it nor any purchaser would have dared complete the
acquisition. In other words, had the possibility of survival been
anticipated this contingency would have frustrated both the
Federal Trade Commission's order and the federal policy of
12 9
fostering free and vigorous competition.
Although Reliance involved a forced sale, it suggests that all
potential purchasers may be reluctant to risk subjection to outstanding labor obligations. Thus, vendors may be forced to sell
at a discount unless they can at least obtain a provision in the
outstanding collective agreement which delineates the effect of
transfer.
While both employers and unions express a desire for certainty
of result prior to the actual transfer, thus far their approaches
to the goal have been diametrically opposed. For example, most
employers have concluded that certainty can best be obtained
through an automatic termination of outstanding labor obligations on transfer, with current labor obligations determined solely by subsequent bargaining1 3° On the other hand, unions have
128. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.
1964).
129. See e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
Among the wage and fringe benefit reductions which Reliance had felt compelled to institute were a reduction in reporting pay, elimination of a holiday,
reduction in holiday pay, stiffened eligibility requirements for vacations, shorter
vacations, lower vacation pay, lower insurance coverage, and a requirement
that employees pay a portion of the premium for insurance coverage. Brief for
Appellant, p. 3, United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891
(3d Cir. 1964).
130. See e.g., cases cited in note 9 supra; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-12, John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Brief for Respondent, p. 4,
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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argued that a future which is certain, stable, and free from
strikes can best be achieved by treating the subsequent employer
as the alter ego of the prior employer.'31 In view of the irreconcilable conflict posed by adherence to either position, and the
uncertainty of arbitration, pre-transfer bargaining could be an
effective means for accomplishing post-transfer certainty.
Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act 1 32 provides that an em-

ployer and a majority union must bargain in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The courts have consistently held that this statutory duty to
bargain does not cease with the signing of a valid collective
agreement but continues during the entire term of the contract.38
Although some commentators have criticized the continuing nature of this duty, particularly where there is a general arbitration
provision,' 3 4 interim bargaining has often proved mutually beneficial where significant changes in the operation of a business,
not anticipated in the agreement, are either anticipated or have
occurred. 1 35 Moreover, where an employer plans to relocate his
business 3 6 or subcontract part of his work '7 he is required to
131. Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, pp. 8-16, John Wiley & Sons v.

Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Compare Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-17,
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The AFL-CIO in its
amicus curiae brief in Wiley argued for maintaining a status quo by declaring
that:
(A] union, representing employees who are performing the same jobs
in the same enterprise, is not going to submit voluntarily to a reduction
in the standards which it had negotiated with the prior owner. Similarly,
a new owner is not voluntarily going to agree to terms and conditions
of employment more burdensome than those which the union previously
accepted-and indeed by which the union would still be bound but for
the fortuity of the sale.
Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, supra at 10. But see note 135 infra and
accompanying text.
132. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §

158(d) (1958).
133. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
134. See Cox & Dunlop, The Duty To Bargain Collectively During the Term
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950) ; Wollett, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and the

NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963). It has been suggested
that when the contract contains a broad arbitration clause, it should govern
all terms of the parties' relationship and that there is no duty to bargain unless
the employer successfully resists a union request to arbitrate. See 77 HARv. L.
REv. 1100, 1106 (1964).
135. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
136. See Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 HAv. L. REV.
1100, 1103-06 (1964).
137. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See

generally Farmer, Bargaining Requirements in Connection With Subcontracting, Plant Removal, Sale of Business, Merger and Consolidation, 14 LAB. L.J.

957 (1963).
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bargain about the effects of such action. A primary purpose of
such bargaining is to permit the union to offer concessions to an
employer who otherwise would be justified in effecting the
change."'1 The same principle seemingly applies to an anticipated
business transfer in a situation where the labor costs under an
existing collective agreement place an insuperable financial burden on the purchaser. Here, the mutual interest of the parties
might well lead to the adoption of an amended wage agreement.
Similarly, since Wiley leaves the question of a general survival
of substantive rights to the arbitrator, to the extent that both
parties desire more certainty and effective control over the consequences of transfer, each will benefit, but undoubtedly in varying degrees, from an amended agreement. 13 9
If the present employer has a duty to bargain under section
8(d), there seems to be no valid reason why, prior to transfer,
a potential employer and the union cannot be required to bargain
collectively concerning the effects of the transfer. 140 It might be
argued that, strictly interpreted, the term "employer" in section
8(d) does not include a potential employer, and thus, that a
union would be justified in refusing to bargain with him. Despite the fact that this view seems unduly restrictive in light of
the purpose of the act, 141 this issue could be avoided if the prior
138. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) ;
Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027, enforcement granted,
316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). But see footnote 125 sitpra.
139. The penchant for either party to enter into an agreement will vary with
the past success of similarly situated parties, and with the role which precedent
comes to play in arbitral decisions. The party who has traditionally won before
an arbitrator will be reluctant to agree to take much less in pre-transfer bargaining. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
140. There can be little doubt that pre-transfer bargaining with respect to
the incidents of transfer would constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining,
i.e., one concerned with wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952); Star
Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963). But cf. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 349 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (no employer duty to bargain concerning
decisions involving investment of new capital).
In a situation involving intermingling, see note 84 .upra and accompanying
text, an extra party-namely, the incumbent union of the purchasing employer-might be included in pre-transfer bargaining. Although many issues
raised by the transfer would be of interest to the incumbent union, primary interests would probably center on issues such as the seniority to be afforded
employees of the acquired firm.
141. A flexible policy is suggested by § 203(d) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964), which states
in relevant part that: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
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employer initiated a bargaining session with the union and the
subsequent employer assumed any resulting agreement.
However, the predisposition of parties to enter pre-transfer
agreements will depend to some extent on the disposition of
courts to permit attacks on amended agreements by individual
union members. This is true since no vendee desires to purchase
a lawsuit. Although the freedom of a union and employer acting
jointly to modify, amend, interpret, or supplement an original
collective agreement has been well established since 1953,142 re-

cently both unions and individual employees have questioned this
principle on the theory that rights which vest under a collective
agreement vest absolutely and are not subject to divestiture. 14
Thus, it is urged that any attempt by a union to alter existing
contractual rights by entering a new agreement with the emdisputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement."
To prevent the union from being forced to bargain with numerous prospective buyers, the Board might condition the duty to bargain, imposing it only
after the prior and subsequent employers had agreed to terms of a transfer, that
transfer to be contingent upon signing a specified supplemental agreement with
the union. Any amended agreement reached with the union could likewise be
made contingent on culmination of the transfer.
Such a procedure was impliedly approved in Wiley when the Court noted
that one reason for its balancing policy was the fact that "employees, and the
union which represents them, ordinarily do not take part in negotiations leading
to a change in corporate ownership," [and therefore] "the negotiations will
ordinarily not concern the well being of the employees, whose advantage or disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964). Pretransfer bargaining would in effect permit such negotiations.
142. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In Huffman
the union and the employer entered into a supplemental agreement providing
a seniority credit for war veterans not granted in the original agreement. The
amendment enhanced the seniority of the veterans and resulted in lay-offs which
otherwise would not have occurred. In justifying its result the Court noted
that:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and
classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not
make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented
is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose
in the exercise of its discretion.
Id. at 338.
143. See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phrases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L.
REv. 1435, 1458, 1467-72, 1514 (1963). See generally Ratner, Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260-66 (1964).
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a breach of the union's duty of
ployer is void and 1 constitutes
44
fair representation.

This argument was for the most part rejected by the Supreme
Court in Humphrey ,v. Moore 145 a class action brought by an

individual employee seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
decision of a joint employer-employee committee to dovetail
seniority lists following a business transfer. The transfer effected a business contraction and the agreement to dovetail
seniority lists resulted in discharge of several employees of the
acquiring firm, 14 6 since the acquired company had been in existence longer.
The Supreme Court refused to grant the injunction reasoning
that under applicable federal law no basis for relief had been
demonstrated. The joint committee decision was within its contractual powers and the union's course of conduct did not constitute a breach of its "duty of fair representation.' 47 The Court
in defining the duty stated that in the absence of fraud, deceitful action, dishonest conduct, or action based on "capricious or
arbitrary factors," no breach is committed when a union, in good
144. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 341 (1964). It should be noted
that the likelihood that claims by individual employees will be asserted has been
greatly enhanced by recent holdings to the effect that individual union members
may maintain an action against their employer under § 301. E.g., Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). But see Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). See generally Kleeb, Recent Problems in the
Creation of Federal Law Under Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 296 (1964) ; Ratner,
Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260 (1964).
While individuals may obtain access to the courts under § 301, it has been
said that "the right to arbitrate under a collective agreement is not ordinarily
a right incident to the employer-employee relationship, but one which is incident to the relationship between employer and union," Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963), and thus cannot properly be exercised by an
individual. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf. Humphrey v. Moore 375 U.S. 335, 341, 344
(1964). See generally id. at 351-59 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ; Kleeb, supra,
at 299-301,
145. 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965) (employee has no cause of action against employer unless attempt
first made at arbitration).
146. The discharged employees persuaded a Kentucky state court to issue
the injunction on the grounds that (a) the joint committee had exceeded its
powers under the collective agreement and (b) the decision of that committee
was arbitrary and the result of dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty
of fair representation. See Moore v. Local 89, 356 S.W2d 241 (Ky. 1962).
147. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964). See generally 2
S.C.L.Q. 289 (1950).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss3/3

36

Patrick: Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Colle
1966]

IMTLIOATIONS OF THE JOHN WUMY CASE

faith, takes a position contrary to that of some individuals whom
it represents.148

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg also bears
significantly on the stability and freedom from litigation which
should be afforded amended agreements. 149 He would go even
farther and deny individual employees the right even to claim
under section 301 "that the collective bargaining contract is violated because the parties have made a grievance settlement going
beyond the strict terms of the existing contract.".'8
Clearly, the Court's adoption of Justice Goldberg's rationale
would result in greater certainty surrounding joint union-management negotiations to amend or interpret collective agreements.
Under this view, the individual employees have no right to attack the product of their joint efforts under section 301. Even
though there is still the possibility of debilitating litigation
under the Court's approach, a degree of certainty is still possible
since the Court so broadly defined the duty of fair representation that most amended agreements will be readily upheld.
It is also possible that the declaratory judgment will become
recognized as a procedural device of some value for avoiding
the uncertainties inherent in post-transfer arbitration. 151 It cannot be denied that the great weight of authority holds that de148. Id. at 349-50. The Court's rationale is suggested by the following
language:

Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances

which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take

a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized
when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict be-

tween employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To

remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
Ibid.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Id. at 355. Mr. Justice Goldberg would not even recognize under § 301

jurisdiction an employee's claim for breach of the union's duty of fair repre-

sentation. Contra Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 243 F.

Supp. 261 (E.D.S.C. 1965) ($56,500 verdict against union for loss of seniority
caused by breach of duty of fair representation). Goldberg's statement was
qualified, somewhat, by the notation that "this is particularly apparent where,"

as here, "no fraud is charged against the employer." 375 U.S. at 355. He went
on to point out that the duty of fair representation is "derived not from the
collective bargaining agreement but implied from the union's rights and re-

sponsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes." Ibid. Consequently, § 301
does not provide an individual employee with a remedy for a union's breach

of that duty. Instead, any relief must be sought from the NLRB, which is

specifically authorized to enforce such statutory duties. Ibid.

151. See Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026

(1965).
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claratory judgments are available under section 301.152 Thus far,
however, the declaratory actions have involved only decisions on
the jurisdictional issue of arbitrability, not a resolution of the
merits of the dispute. 15 3 Accordingly, a declaratory action to
determine that the duty to arbitrate does not survive would be
of value in pre-transfer planning only when the employer is
certain that there will be insufficient elements of business continuity. This is true since an adverse judgment would still require submission of the dispute to arbitration following the
transfer.
It is possible, nevertheless, that future courts will be willing
to hear the merits of the survival issues in a declaratory proceeding. 15 4 Employers seeking such a judgment would be faced
primarily with a union argument that judicial determination
derogates from the mutually agreed jurisdiction of arbitration.
This charge could be countered, however, by the argument that
the proceeding was beyond the scope of agreed arbitration since
the contemplated transfer will seldom have ripened into a griev152. E.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F2d

179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; see 93 CoNG. REc. 3656-57 (1947) (remarks of Congressman Hartley). See cases cited Jay, Arbitration and the Federal Common Law
of Collective BargainingAgreements, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 448, 452-53 n.20 (1962).

153. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding

Workers, 344 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1965) (declaratory action to determine legality
of bargaining provision upon which current grievance based); Black-Clawson

Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F,2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Council
of Western Elec. Technical Employees v. Western Elec. Co., 238 F.2d 892,

897 (2d Cir. 1956) (L. Hand, J.) (merits of arbitrable matter expressly reserved for arbitral determination); Fitchberrg Paper Co. v. MacDonald, 242
F. Supp. 504 (D. Mass. 1965) (declaratory action on the propriety of antici-

pated conduct). But see Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Communications
Workers, 239 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1965) (semble).
Most declaratory judgments have not questioned the arbitrability of a dispute which would be raised by anticipated, future actions. Most have really
been little more than camouflaged actions to compel arbitrability of current

disputes. Compare Fitchberrg Paper Co. v. MacDonald, 242 F. Supp. 504 (D.

Mass. 1965) (declaratory action on the propriety of anticipated conduct), wuith

Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1962) ("declaratory judgment" ordering arbitration of a current dispute).
Federal courts will, however, hear the merits of a labor dispute in a declaratory action if there is no clause in the bargaining agreement providing for
arbitration. Allied Oil Workers v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1965);

UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962) (all steps taken
necessary to precipitate the dispute, thus declaratory judgment of the actual
controversy proper).
154. See Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965).
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ance as defined by the bargaining agreement. 5 5 Nevertheless, an
attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment on the merits of the
survival issues will probably be unsuccessful. At best it will be
a form, of -orum shopping of questionable value which should
be attempted only as a last resort after pre-transfer bargaining
has failed. 156
V. CoNCUsioN AND SUMMARY

The Wiley doctrine has had and will continue to have a substantial influence on labor-management planning both during
bargaining sessions and when a transfer is contemplated. In its
simplest form, the doctrine requires submission to arbitration of
disputes concerning the survival of rights after a transfer when
the bargaining agreement contains a general arbitration provision. When the duty to arbitrate does survive, the incidents of
survival are left largely to the discretion of the arbitrator.
Where the terms of the agreement and available evidence do not
provide a reasonable basis for imposing current obligations on
the successor employer however, the arbitrator should abstain.
This practice is proper not only because he lacks the power to
conjure up new contracts but also because long-run industrial
stability will be enhanced by resolving the issues through continuous collective bargaining.
Although arbitrators have traditionally approached the problem of rights survival with caution, judicial respect for arbitral
awards would indicate that most awards will be judicially enforced. Nevertheless, an arbitrator's award will probably be
unenforceable if he exceeds his remedial authority or disregards
other limitations in the agreement. Judicial review will also be
possible where an award is contrary to some external legal limitation on the arbitrator's authority. Accordingly, non-enforce155. See Schofield Mfg. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 225 (Duff 1965) (abstract grievance held non-arbitrable since not a mature controversy and advisory opinions
were unauthorized). But cf. Allied Oil Workers v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 49
(5th Cir. 1965); UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
Compare Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1958) (method of final adjustment selected by parties for settling
grievance disputes, the desirable method).
When legal action has been instituted on a matter that is arbitrable, courts
have usually granted a motion to stay the legal proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration. See cases cited note 69 stpra.
156. While courts would need a different rationale, it is quite possible that
they would grant a motion to stay pending arbitration as they would when a
judgment is sought on the merits subsequent to a grievance but the agreement
contains an arbitration provision.
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ment by the reviewing court appears possible when the award
requires a violation of federal or state statute; when the award
is inconsistent with public policy; or when the arbitrator disregards or misapplies some principle of federal substantive law
relating to the bargaining agreement.
The many uncertainties in labor relations which may be precipitated by a transfer of business can be substantially eliminated through collective bargaining. If either the employer or
the union foresees a possibility of transfer, the parties should
bargain for a provision in the collective agreement governing
that contingency. Even absent such foresight, uncertainty can
be obviated if a purchasing employer and the incumbent union
enter into an amended agreement prior to the actual transfer.
Thus, pre-transfer bargaining permits the interested parties to
retain control over survival and avoid the uncertainty inherent
in arbitration and possible litigation.
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